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Initially,  the  global  financial  crisis  caused  a  surge  of  financial  inflows  to  China,  raising 
investment, but this abated in 2008, leaving a substantial contraction in export demand.  The 
government’s key response was to commit to an unprecedented fiscal expansion.  Two oft-
ignored consequences are, first that government spending is on non-traded goods and services 
and  so  enlarges  the  consequent  real appreciation  and,  second,  that  a  more  inward-looking 
economy causes firms to face less elastic demand and hence to increase oligopoly rents, further 
enlarging the real appreciation.  Both are important for China because of the contribution of its 
real-exchange-rate sensitive, low-margin labour-intensive export sector to total employment.  
An economy-wide analysis is offered, using a model that takes explicit account of oligopoly 
behaviour.  The results suggest that a conventional fiscal expansion would further contract the 
Chinese economy.  On the other hand, notwithstanding the export contraction further industrial 
reform, emphasising the largely state-owned sectors, would reduce costs and foster growth in 
both output and modern sector employment.    
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1 Introduction 
With exports almost half of its GDP and most of these directed to Europe and North 
America, negative financial shocks in those regions might have been expected to retard China’s 
growth.
2  And since China assembles manufactured components from elsewhere in Asia and 
the Pacific,
3 the extent of its “decoupling” was the key to wider regional performance.  Early in 
the crisis, however, a mitigating factor was the transitory flight of more of the world’s savings 
into Chinese investment in the form of both FDI and “hot money”, the latter arising in spite of 
attempts  by  the  government  to  strengthen  inward  capital  controls  on  volatility  grounds.
4  
Subsequently, however, the fall in US and European investment began to be matched by a fall 
in  their  total  saving,  as  income  growth  slowed  and  governments  began  issuing  new  debt.  
China  was  then  left  with  a  contraction  in  export  demand  uncompensated  by  further  new 
investment from abroad.  The scale of the export contraction was considerable, as indicated in 
Figure 1, and it was accompanied by declines in RMB export prices, though the latter effect 
was more than compensated by declines in petroleum and other import commodity prices as 
they came off their pre-crisis highs. 
The Chinese government’s principal response has been to promise an unprecedented 
fiscal expansion, amounting to seven per cent of GDP, directed at sustaining growth by raising 
domestic  demand.
5    In  the  long  run  there  is  wide  agreement  that  China’s  growth  will  be 
underpinned by rising consumption rather than exports (Lardy, 2006; Kuijs, 2006, Kuijs and 
He 2007; Azziz and Cui, 2007).  Yet the rise in government spending need not have this effect.  
Indeed, it is not clear whether so substantial an increase in the national debt is the best course 
of action for China.  Much turns on the unusual structure of the Chinese economy, which has 
most modern sector employment concentrated in relatively low-margin export manufacturing, 
and the effect of such a shock on China’s real exchange rate.  By reducing national saving, 
other  things  equal  the  shock  should  cause  a  real  appreciation  which  would  hurt  export 
industries already hit by the foreign demand contraction.  The extent of this further damage 
                                                
2 This is the more so since it appears that those financial shocks have caused a speculative retreat to commodities 
which has, at least temporarily, shifted the international terms of trade against China. 
3 For evidence supporting the prominence of the components trade with other Asian economies, see Athukorala 
(2005). 
4 FDI approvals were at unprecedented levels in the final quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 and there 
was clear evidence of “hot money” arriving against China’s inward capital controls.  See Pettis (2008), McKibbin 
and Stoekel and Tyers and Bain (2008). 
5 The Chinese government’s concern over the export slowdown is exemplified by Premier Wen’s address to the 
twin sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference in 
March 2009 (news.xinhuanet.com).   2 
depends on the scale of the real appreciation, which in turn depends on the distribution of 
government spending between the traded and non-traded sectors and on the tendency for a 
more inward-looking economy to cause firms to face less elastic demand and hence to increase 
oligopoly rents.
6  These effects are explored in this paper, in combination with the associated 
effects on sectoral structure and the distribution and level of employment. 
The approach adopted differs from those of previous studies on these topics in that it 
employs an  economy-wide model  that takes explicit account  of oligopoly behaviour  in 17 
industrial  and  service  sectors.
7    This  model  makes  it  possible  to  examine  the  interactions 
between external shocks, fiscal policy, industrial reform and regulatory policy in response to 
the export slowdown.  Not only can the implications of policy responses for overall economic 
performance be assessed but it is also possible to examine their effects on the current account 
surplus and, critically, China’s real exchange rate.  Indeed, the results suggest that a substantial 
fiscal expansion would not deliver a net retention of jobs in China.  While the usual tendency 
of fiscal expansions to arrest deflation and, thereby, raise employment tends to more than offset 
the real appreciation effects due to expenditure on non-traded goods, we show that the real 
appreciation is considerably enlarged by the oligopoly effects.  By contrast, further industrial 
reforms, incorporating privatisation and increased competition in heavy industry and services, 
would tend to depreciate the real exchange rate and thus have the effect of expanding both 
employment and exports along with overall growth. 
The next section reviews Asia’s, and in particular China’s, past fiscal conservatism, 
highlighting the contrast between long term practice and China’s current policy response.  In 
Section  3,  the  special  structure  of  the  Chinese  economy  is  detailed  along  with  elemental 
reasoning behind the sensitivity of its employment performance to real exchange rate changes 
associated with government expenditure on the one hand and oligopoly rents in the largely 
non-traded  sectors  on  the  other.    Section  4  then  describes  the  model  used  and  Section  5 
presents the simulated effects of fiscal expansions.  Section 6 then considers the alternative of 
further industrial reforms.  Conclusions are provided in Section 7. 
 
2. Fiscal Conservatism and Growth in Asia 
  That the Chinese government should consider so large a fiscal expansion to be the 
appropriate response to the export downturn contrasts with its revealed preference over three 
                                                
6 While the effects of unfettered oligopoly rents on the real exchange rate are explored by Tyers (2008), the idea 
that fiscal expansions cause real appreciations because governments spend mainly on non-traded goods goes back 
to De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Froot and Rogoff (1995), among others. 
7 The model is a distant descendant of that by Harris (1984).   3 
decades of strong economic performance accompanied by consistent fiscal conservatism.  This 
may have reflected a cultural preference for more forward-looking behaviour that embodies 
higher private saving and investment and a corresponding social preference for similar fiscal 
policy.    Whatever  the  origin,  it  has  been  associated  with  far  superior  economic  growth 
performance than any other part of the world in recent decades.  As Table 1 shows, with few 
exceptions the Asian region as a whole has exhibited more fiscal restraint than the rest of the 
world since the 1960s and this practice has been associated with its recording stronger GDP 
growth performances.  By contrast, the practice in many more poorly governed developing 
regions, with attendant weaknesses in their power to tax combined with political pressures to 
redress  distributional  inequities  through  government  spending,  has  often  been  to  monetise 
fiscal  deficits  and  thereby  create  financial  and exchange  rate  instability  sufficient  to  deter 
investment and slow GDP growth.
8 
  In China’s particular case, since the opening of its economy in the late 1970s, its level 
of general government final consumption expenditure has been stable at about 15 per cent of its 
GDP.  As suggested by Figure 2, the development of its taxation system has been sufficient to 
ensure that its many surges in GDP growth have been accompanied by corresponding increases 
in  revenue.    At  the  same  time  industrial  reforms  have  seen  a  general  decline  in  the 
government’s direct role in product and service supply and a retreat to indirect regulatory 
regimes and tax incentives.  Government debt has remained low and, in spite of the Asian 
financial crisis of the 1990s and the more recent global slowdown, China’s financial system 
has been comparatively stable.  This is in no small measure the reason for China’s absorption 
of more FDI than any  other developing country and  for its  heretofore excellent  economic 
performance. 
  More recently, fiscal profligacy has become popular in most regions of the world.  As 
demand has contracted and private firms have deleveraged, governments have borrowed in 
attempts to replace lost spending.  Even where Keynesian multipliers exceed unity, these fiscal 
expansions inevitably cause substantial realignment of real exchange rates.
9  It will turn out 
that, by virtue of its peculiar economic structure, China’s Keynesian multiplier could well be 
negative, and certainly that its economic performance is strongly dependent on the implications 
of its policy response for its the real exchange rate. 
 
                                                
8 See Little et al. (1993) and Corden (1994). 
9 Empirical research on fiscal expansions during peacetime is not supportive of strong multiplier effects.  See, for 
the case of the US, Barro (1981).   4 
3. The Role of the Real Exchange Rate 
  The special sensitivity of China’s economic performance to its real exchange rate stems 
from its economic structure, as summarised in Table 2.  Note that 1) the great majority of non-
agricultural  employment  is  in  the  export-oriented  light  manufacturing  sector  –  indeed, 
employment in this sector exceeds that in agriculture, 2) this sector is relatively competitive – 
price mark-ups are low and so pure or economic profits make up only a small share of total 
revenue,  and  3)  the  SOE-dominated  energy,  metals  and  services  sectors  are  less  labour-
intensive and at the same time they are oligopolistic, generating substantial rents that form a 
buffer against downturns.  These facts clearly suggest that total labour demand in China is 
comparatively sensitive to the relativities between home wages and export prices, and hence to 
its real exchange rate. 
  The key sensitivities explored in this paper are between China’s real exchange rate and 
its government spending on the one hand and the oligopoly rents earned in its energy, metals 
and services sectors on the other.  Consider first the effects of increased government spending.  
It is well understood that, in the realistic case where financial capital is imperfectly mobile 
internationally,  other  things  equal  increased government borrowing raises home yields and 
induces  financial  inflow.    The  net  effect  is  to  raise  demand  for  home  relative  to  (more 
elastically supplied) foreign products and services and hence to appreciate the real exchange 
rate.  Beyond this, however, it was recognised by De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Froot and 
Rogoff  (1995),  and  more  recently  Galstyan  and  Land  (2009),  that  boosting  government 
expenditure  further  appreciates  the  real  exchange  rate  by  changing  the  composition  of 
aggregate demand.
10  This is because governments spend mainly on non-traded goods and 
services.  This effect is illustrated in Figure 3, which is based on the abstraction that goods and 
services are starkly divided according to their tradability.  If the share of government spending 
in aggregate demand rises, then the pattern of implied preferences shifts favouring non-traded 
goods, appreciating the real exchange rate. 
  In assessing fiscal expansions, these well known negative effects are seen as being 
more than offset by the resulting expansion in aggregate demand.  A key mechanism for this is 
that the increase in government dissaving reduces the national saving rate, at least temporarily, 
requiring the failure of Ricardian equivalence.
11  Because reduced national saving contracts the 
                                                
10 Galstyan and Lane (2009) distinguish between government spending and government investment, finding that 
the latter tends to cause real depreciation.  In the short run, however, all investment is intensive in non-traded 
services like construction and, within its gestation period, should cause appreciation.  Of course, in the long run it 
adds to the capital stock and causes depreciation.  For an application to China, see Tyers et al. (2008). 
11 Consistent with the empirical evidence, in what follows we assume Ricardian equivalence does fail in China.   5 
leakage of expenditure abroad, which in China takes the form of foreign reserve accumulation, 
the current account surplus is reduced and more Chinese expenditure falls on the home relative 
to the foreign economy.  This has the effect of either inducing a home inflation or arresting a 
deflation, thus preventing output prices from falling relative to wage costs in the short run and 
hence preserving employment.  Other things equal, by lowering real wage costs, this effect 
tends to constrain any real appreciation due to the composition of government spending. 
  But there is a further real appreciating effect not commonly recognised.  This is due to 
oligopoly rents, which are considerable in China’s energy, metals and services sectors.
12  In 
essence, since the excess profits are achieved by supplying less output than would occur in 
competitive markets they reduce productivity in the largely non-traded sectors of the economy.  
Again employing the abstraction that goods and services are either tradable or not, the effect of 
this productivity contraction on relative prices is illustrated in Figure 4.  It raises the prices of 
non-traded  goods  relative  to  traded  goods  and  hence  China’s  real  exchange  rate.    Fiscal 
expansions  tend  to  exacerbate  this  effect  by  redirecting  demand  to  toward  the  oligopoly 
sectors.  By contrast, further reforms to competition policy and regulatory practice that reduce 
these  oligopoly  rents  would  have  the  opposite  effect  and  spur  Chinese  employment  by 
sustaining  the  expansion  in  the  labour-intensive  and  real-exchange-rate-sensitive  light 
manufacturing sector.  To quantify the effects of these changes on the real exchange rate and 
hence on China’s economic performance, we turn to a more complete model of the Chinese 
economy. 
 
4. An Oligopoly Model of the Chinese Economy 
  We  use  a  comparative  static  macroeconomic  model  of  the  Chinese  economy  that 
embodies a multi-industry structure in which all industries are treated as oligopolies, with firms 
in each industry supplying differentiated products and interacting on prices.
13  Government 
expenditure  creates  demands  for  goods  and  services  via  nested  constant  elasticity  of 
substitution (CES) preferences and government revenue stems from a tax system that includes 
both direct (income) taxes levied separately on labour and capital income and indirect taxes 
including those on consumption, imports and exports.
14  A capital goods sector is included 
which  translates  investment  expenditure  into  product  and  service  demands,  again  using  a 
nested  CES  preference  structure.    The  level  of  total  investment  expenditure  has  Q-like 
                                                
12 The wider effects of these on the Chinese economy are examined by Tyers and Lu (2008). 
13 It is a distant descendant of that by Harris (1984), Gunasekera and Tyers (1990) and Tyers (2005), though it is 
considerably generalised to include macroeconomic behaviour, as in Tyers and Lu (2008). 
14 Income taxes are approximated by flat rates deduced as the quotient of revenue and the tax base in each case.   6 
behaviour,  being  influenced  positively  by  home  rates  of  return  on  installed  capital  and 
negatively by a financing rate obtainable from an open “bond market” in which home and 
foreign bonds are differentiated to represent China’s capital controls.  Savings are sourced from 
the collective household at a constant rate and from corporations at industry-specific rates 
applying to the magnitudes of pure (economic) profits earned.  Foreign direct investment and 





The scope of the model is detailed in Table 3.  Firms in all industries are oligopolistic in 
their  product  pricing  behaviour  with  the  degree  of  price-setting  collusion  between  them 
represented  by  conjectural  variations  parameters  that  are  set  to  account  for  the  degree  of 
regulatory  surveillance.    Each  firm  bears  fixed  capital  and  labour  costs,  enabling  the 
representation  of  unrealised  economies  of  scale.    Home  products  in  each  industry  are 
differentiated  by  variety  and  output  is  Cobb-Douglas  in  variable  factors  and  intermediate 
inputs.  While firms are oligopolists in their product markets they have no oligopsony power as 
purchasers  of primary factors or  intermediate inputs.
16  The economy  modelled  is “almost 
small”, implying that it has no power to influence border prices of its imports but its exports 
are  differentiated  from  competing  products  abroad  and  hence  face  finite-elastic  demand.
17    
The consumer price index is constructed as a composite Cobb-Douglas-CES index of post-
consumption-tax  home  product  and  post-tariff  import  prices,  derived  from  the  aggregate 
household’s expenditure function.  This formulation of the CPI aids in the analysis of welfare 
impacts.  Because  collective  utility  is also  defined as a  Cobb-Douglas combination of  the 
volumes of consumption by generic product, proportional changes in overall economic welfare 
correspond with those in real GNP.
18 
                                                
15 Hereafter the capital, financial and official sub-accounts of China’s balance of payments will be referred to as 
the “capital account”. 
16 Imports in each industrial category are seen as homogeneous, differentiated from home products as a group, so 
that import varietal diversity never changes.  Since all home varieties are exported there is no movement on the 
“extensive margin” of the type that is evident in the models of non-homogeneous export industries by 
Melitz(2003) and Balistreri et al. (2007). 
17 The effective numeraire is the import product bundle.  Consumer and GDP price indices are constructed for real 
aggregations, following the practice in national modelling since Dixon et al. (1982) and Harris (1984). 
18 When the utility function is Cobb-Douglas in consumption volumes, the expenditure function is Cobb-Douglas 
in prices.  If the consumer price level, 
C P , is defined as a Cobb-Douglas index of prices, the equivalent variation 
in income can be expressed in terms of the proportional change in this index.  Thus, following any shock, the 
income equivalent of the resulting changes to income and prices is:   7 
  The quantity of domestically-owned physical capital is fixed both in the short and long 
runs, so that changes in the total capital stock affect the foreign ownership share and hence the 
level  of  income  repatriated  abroad.    Several  closures  are  used  in  the  experiments  to  be 
presented.  The first represents the short run: physical capital is fixed in supply and immobile 
between industries.  Production labour is mobile between industries but at a fixed real (CPI-
deflated)  wage,  so  that  employment  is  endogenous,  and  the  remaining  factors,  while  also 
mobile between industries, are fixed in endowment and flexibly priced.  There is no entry or 
exit of firms but the magnitudes of pure profits earned are endogenous.  A medium run closure 
is also defined which differs from this only in that the production real wage is flexible and 
production employment is fixed.  Finally, a long run closure is employed in which physical 
capital  is  homogeneous  and  fully  mobile  between  industries  and  internationally  at  a  fixed 
external rate of return.  All real unit factor rewards are flexible, with total supplies fixed, and 
there is free entry and exit of firms with exogenous rates of pure profit in each industry.  Fiscal 
policy closures vary according to application.  In most applications, consistent with China’s 
heretofore  fiscal  conservatism,  the  base  fiscal  surplus  is  held  constant  so  that  changes  in 
endogenous revenue lead to corresponding changes in government expenditure. 
 
Macroeconomic behaviour 
  As befits a comparative static analysis, the macroeconomics embodied is elemental.  
The short run closure fixes productive capital use in all industries but allows investment that 
would affect production in the future.  Central is the open economy capital market which is 
built around the market clearing identity: 
(10)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) , , , * , *
EXP c
D DH NF I r r S Y G S r r R r r π = + −∆  , 
where r is the home real financing rate (bond yield), r* is the real yield on bonds abroad (the 
two  being  differentiated  and  so  offering  different  yields).    Total  domestic  saving  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) D H DH C S S Y S T G π = + + − ,  where H S   is  saving  from  home  household  disposable 
income.  The household saving rate is assumed fixed, so that SH = sH YDH.  Following Tyers and 
                                                                                                                                                     







W Y Y EV P P Y Y Y Y
P
∆
∆ = − + = − −  , 










P W Y P
W Y Y P
  ∆
− −  
∆ ∆ ∆   = ≅ −  . 
This is, approximately, the proportional change in real GNP.   8 
Lu (2008), China’s extraordinarily high level of corporate saving,  C S , is assumed to stem only 
from pure profits, π , with a distinct but fixed saving rate assumed for each industry: 
(11)  C Ci Ci i
i i
S S s π = = ∑ ∑  . 
The last two terms of (10) represent net private and public flows on the capital account.   NF S  is 
the inflow of private foreign saving to finance investment in China net of Chinese private 
saving  going abroad and  R ∆   is the annual addition to  official foreign  reserves.   
c r is  the 









δ = −  , 
where 
K P   is  the  price  of  capital  goods, 
Y P   is  the  product  price  and  δ   is  the  rate  of 
depreciation.  An average of these rates is  taken that is  weighted by value  added in each 
industry to obtain 











This relationship constrains the investment response to a change in either the rate of return or 
the  financing  rate,  offering  a  reduced  form  representation  of  either  gestation  costs  or 
expectations over short run consequences of installation for the rate of return. 
  In most modern macro models of open economies private financial flows are driven by 
exchange rate expectations.  In China’s case capital controls are tight and inflows mainly take 
the form of state-approved FDI.  In our comparative static analysis net foreign saving,  NF S , is 
motivated by the difference between the home and foreign bond yield.  A linear relationship is 
used to allow for reversals of the direction of net flow in response to shocks. 
(14)  ( ) * NF SF SF S a b r r = + −  . 
The tight capital controls necessitate a low level of responsiveness and so  SF b  is small (the 
supply of net foreign private saving is inelastic).  Correspondingly, the combination of China’s 
high  saving rate  with outward  capital controls necessitates that the surplus of saving over 
investment, which amounts to  a tenth  of GDP, be directed abroad by  the PBC as  official 
foreign reserves.  This behaviour depends on a relationship that is linear, for the same reason as 
in (14): 
(15)  ( ) * DR DR R a b r r ∆ = − − ,   9 
where the movement of reserves is much more elastic to the home real interest rate than that of 
private financial capital, so that  DR SF b b >> .  The effect of this is to stabilise the home real rate 
in  response  to  shocks,  which  cause,  instead,  elastic  movements  in  the  rate  of  reserve 
accumulation.
19 
  The capital market clearing identity (10) then determines the home real interest rate and 
the  magnitude  of  the  capital  account  deficit  ( NF D R S S I ∆ − = − ).    This  is  then  equal  in 
magnitude to the current account surplus [ ( ) , * X M N r r − + , where N is net factor income 
from abroad
20].  Shocks originating in the determinants of domestic saving and investment, and 
hence in external flows, cause home (relative to foreign) product prices (and hence the real 
exchange  rate)  to  adjust  sufficiently  to  clear  home  markets  and  preserve  the  balance  of 
payments. 
 
Short run effects in a real model 
  In the short run nominal wage rigidity is important and this is not readily represented in 
real models such as this one.  Indeed, nominal rigidity is essential to properly representing the 
effects of fiscal expansions, since their claimed beneficial effects depend on demand effects 
that alter the relationship between product prices and wage costs in the short run.  China’s 
nominal exchange rate targeting macroeconomic policy regime makes it possible to overcome 
this deficiency of our real model, however.  In this case, any change in the real exchange rate 
takes the form of a corresponding change in the domestic price level.  If the nominal exchange 
rate,  E,  is  defined  as  the  number  of  units  of  foreign  exchange  obtained  for  a  unit  of  the 
domestic currency, then the real exchange rate, 
R e , can be defined correspondingly as the rate 
of exchange between the home product bundle and corresponding bundles produced abroad.  It 
follows that the bilateral real exchange rate with foreign trading partner i can be approximated 
as the common currency ratio of the GDP prices of the two countries, 
Y P  and  /
Y










= ,  
                                                
19 It is argued elsewhere (Tyers and Bain 2007, for example) that, given the commitment to outward capital 
controls and the high saving rate, the PBC has little residual discretion over annual increments to reserves.  This is 
because there is no incentive for China’s commercial banks to do other than relinquish unused foreign currency to 
the PBC.  The scale of reserve accumulations are therefore not an instrument in the PBC’s monetary policy.  Yet, 
by soaking up domestic saving through the issue of “sterilisation bonds” the PBC’s reserve accumulation has the 
effect of preventing downward pressure on that rate.  Equation (14) is intended merely as a reduced form 
description of this process. 
20 As modelled, N comprises a fixed net private inflow of income from assets abroad and fixed aid to the 
government, less endogenous repatriated earnings from foreign-owned physical capital in China.   10 
and so, when E is targeted and there is no indirect effect on the foreign currency price level in 
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If  we  then  assume  that  our  short  run  is  sufficiently  tight  to  render  the  nominal  wage  of 








  so that  ˆ ˆ
R w e = −  . 
Our short run closure is therefore modified to tie the real production wage to the endogenous 
real exchange rate changes. 
 
Oligopoly in supply 
  Firms  in  each  industry  supply  differentiated  products.    They  carry  product-variety-
specific fixed costs and interact on prices.  Cobb-Douglas production drives variable costs so 
that average variable costs are constant if factor and intermediate product prices do not change 
but average total cost declines with output.  Firms charge a mark-up over average variable cost 
which  they  choose  strategically.    Their  capacity  to  push  their  price  beyond  their  average 
variable costs without being undercut by existing competitors then determines the level of any 
pure profits and, in the long run, the potential for entry by new firms. 
  Thus, each firm in industry i is regarded as producing a unique variety of its product 

















where  i p  is the firm’s product price,  i ν is its average variable cost and  i ε  is the elasticity of 
demand  it  faces.    Firms  choose  their  optimal  price  by  taking  account  of  the  price-setting 
behaviour of other firms.  A conjectural variations parameter in industry i is then defined as the 












These  parameters  are  exogenous,  reflecting  industry-specific  free-rider  behaviour  and  the 
power of  price surveillance by regulatory agencies.  The Nash equilibrium  case is  a non-
collusive differentiated Bertrand oligopoly in which each firm chooses its price, taking the   11 
prices of all other firms as given.  In this case the conjectural variations parameter (17) is zero.  
When  firms  behave  as  a  perfect  cartel,  it  has  the  value  unity.    This  parameter  enters  the 
analysis through the varietal demand elasticity. 
  Critical to the implications of imperfect competition in the model is that the product of 
each industry has exposure to five different sources of demand.  The elasticity of demand faced 
by firms in industry i, εi, is therefore dependent on the elasticities of demand in these five 
markets,  as  well as  the  shares  of  the  home  product  in  each.    They  are final  demand  (F), 
investment demand (V), intermediate demand (I), export demand (X) and government demand 
(G).  For industry i, the elasticity that applies to (19), above, is a composite of the elasticities of 
all five sources of demand.
21 
(21)  ,
F F V V I I X X G G
i i i i i i i i i i s s s s s i ε ε ε ε ε ε = + + + + ∀  
where 
j
i s  denotes the volume share of the home product in market i for each source of demand 
j.  These share parameters are fully endogenous in the model. 
Thus, the strategic behaviour of firms, and hence the economic cost of oligopolies, is 
affected by collusive behaviour on the one hand and the composition of the demands faced by 
firms on the other, both of which act through the average elasticity of varietal demand.  The 
collusive behaviour enters through conjectural variations parameters and composition through 
the demand shares 
j
i s .  Of course, the capacity firms have to reduce their prices also depends 
on their productivity performance, which we do not examine in this paper, and on the fixed 
cost burden carried by each industry and hence on firm numbers. 
To study the effects of price-cap regulation a Ramsey mark-up, 
R










=  . 
Compromise mark-ups can be simulated by altering the parameter  i ϕ  in an equation for the 
“chosen” mark-up: 
(23)  ( ) ( ) 1 2
C R
i i i i i m m m i ϕ ϕ = − + − ∀  . 
Thus, when  1 ,
C
i i i m m ϕ = = , and when  2 ,
C R
i i i m m ϕ = = . 
 
The database and its representation of broad economic structure 
                                                 
21 The expressions for these elasticities are messy and voluminous.  They are derived in appendices to Tyers and 
Lu (2008).   12 
The  flow  data  for  the  current  model  originates  from  the  GTAP  Version  6  global 
database  for  2001.
22    It  combines  detailed  bilateral  trade,  transport  and  protection  data 
characterizing  economic  linkages  among  regions,  together  with  individual  country  national 
accounts, government accounts, balance of payments data and input-output tables which enable 
the quantification of inter-sectoral flows within and between regions.  Factor shares and input 
output coefficients from these 2001 data are combined with Chinese national accounts and 
balance of payments data for 2005, inflating the database to that year and readjusting it for 
balance.    Key  structural  elements  are  evident  from  Table  2,  which  shows  that  China’s 
measured GDP is dominated by light manufacturing and services.  The major contributors to 
exports are also those that export the largest shares of their output.  Table 4 confirms that the 
traded industries in general and the exporting light manufacturing industries in particular are 
intensive in production labour.  This is most notably true of processed agricultural products and 
textiles. 
 
Calibration of pure profits and oligopoly parameters 
The flows represented in the database do not reveal details of intra-sectoral industrial 
structure.  To represent oligopolistic behaviour, additional information is required on effective 
firm numbers, pure profits, fixed costs and minimum efficient scale for each industry.  With the 
support of China’s official statistics these variables are calibrated in the following manner.  
First, pure profits are required as a share of total revenue in each industry.  This is needed to 
finalise  the  flow  database  by  splitting  capital  payments  between  market  and  over-market 
returns.
23  It is also a starting point for calibrating industry competitive structure.  Second, 
rough estimates are required of strategically interacting firm numbers in each industry and their 
corresponding  conjectural  variations  parameters.    Again,  official  statistics  provide  firm 
numbers and sizes and the proportion that are private and state-owned.
24 
Third, to complete the formulation of industry demand elasticities, values of elasticities 
of substitution between home product varieties on the one hand, and between generic home and 
foreign products on the other, are required for each industry.  These are initially drawn from 
                                                 
22 Documentation on the GTAP 6 Data Package may be viewed at: 
<http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/>. 
23 Pure profit shares of total revenue in 2005were high in “metals and minerals”, “petroleum and energy”, 
“telecommunications”, “insurance and finance” and “transport”.  Data on accounting profits in the latter three 
sectors is comparatively weak and the estimates are partly judgemental, accounting for such determinants as low 
borrowing rates for these SOE dominated sectors and hence low capital service costs.  See the appendices to Tyers 
and Lu (2008). 
24 Effective firm numbers are smaller than totals since pricing is frequently dominated by a few large firms in each 
sector.  For oligopolistic sectors in China, these tend to be state owned enterprises.  See Tyers and Lu (2008).   13 
the estimation literature.
25   Preliminary industry  demand elasticities are then calculated for 
each source of demand (final, intermediate, investment, government and export).  Initial shares 
of the demand facing each industry are then drawn from the database to enable the calculation 
of weighted average demand elasticities for each industry.  Preliminary mark-up  ratios are 
deduced from these, via (19).  The initial equilibrium industry shares, elasticities and mark-up 
ratios  for  each  industry  are  given  in  Table  5.
26    This  completes  the  initial  demand  side 
calibration.  Work on the supply side begins with the application of mark-up ratios to deduce 
the initial level of average variable cost in each industry.  Then the proportion of pure profits in 
total revenue is deducted from the mark-up to arrive at fixed cost revenue shares.
27  Total 
recurrent fixed cost in each industry then follows.  At this point these results are reviewed and, 
where conflicting information is available on fixed cost shares of total turnover, the calibration 
is recommenced with new initial elasticities.
28 
Importantly for the interpretation of later results, Table 5 also makes clear that the five 
sources of  demand facing  firms in each industry are not equally  elastic.   Export  and final 
demand are the most elastic and intermediate demand the least.
29  Also from Table 5 it is 
evident that, where exports dominate demand firms face larger elasticities and charge smaller 
mark-ups.  Consistent with these observations, pure profit shares of total revenue tend to be 
small or even negative for export-oriented industries and very large for the SOE dominated 
industries: petroleum, metals and minerals, telecommunications, finance and transport. 
 
5. The Export Slowdown with a Fiscal Expansion 
  Here we simulate a contraction in export demand for Chinese goods, combined with 
two alternative fiscal expansion scenarios.  The first is a rise in government spending by about 
seven per cent of initial GDP and the second is a reduction in corporate taxation that differs by 
                                                 
25 Summaries of this literature are offered by Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) and at http://www.gtap. 
purdue.edu/databases/. 
26 Note that the reason the elasticities appear large in magnitude at first glance is that they do not represent the 
slopes of industry demand curves for generic goods.  Rather, they are the elasticities faced by suppliers of 
individual varieties and are made larger by inter-varietal substitution. 
27 Fixed costs take the form of both physical and human capital costs using the rule of thumb (based on estimates 
by Harris and Cox, 1983) that physical capital has a fixed cost share of 5/6. 
28 The actual calibration process is yet more complex than this because the elasticities of intermediate demand 
depend on intermediate cost shares, which depend on the variable cost share.  It is therefore necessary to calibrate 
iteratively for consistency of elasticities and shares. 
29 Export demand is found to be more elastic because of the larger number of substitutable product varieties 
available abroad while intermediate demand is relatively inelastic because of firms’ reluctance to alter 
arrangements for intermediate input supply which may depend on location or “just in time” relationships.  These 
issues are addressed empirically by Harris and Cox (1983).   14 
sector so as to eliminate company tax on export production.
30  A short run closure is adopted, 
which embodies nominal exchange rate targeting and nominal wage rigidity as per (18) and 
flexible production employment, no sectoral or international mobility of physical capital and 
fixed numbers of home firms (product varieties) with variable pure profits.
31  Fiscal closures 
have a fixed government deficit and endogenous expenditure when the export demand shock is 
applied alone, consistent with China’s heretofore fiscal conservatism, and a flexible deficit and 
exogenous spending when fiscal policy changes are introduced. 
 
The export slowdown 
  This takes the form of a uniform shock to all foreign excess demand functions sufficient 
to reduce the value of China’s exports by the proportion observed to the end of 2008 - eight per 
cent.   In  addition there is a  fall in  the  petroleum  import price by  a quarter, reflecting  the 
observed change to that point since 2005.  As Table 6 shows, lower foreign demand reduces 
the home price level and so depreciates the real exchange rate.
32  This offsets somewhat the 
extent of the export loss but, with the decline in aggregate demand and the rigidity of the 
nominal  production  wage,  GDP  and  employment  are  substantially  smaller,  with  the  latter 
decline (as shown in Table 7) amounting to 20 million jobs.  Skilled wages and resource rents 
also decline, indicating that the negative shock is shared across the key primary factors and not 
borne only by labour.
33  The sectoral effects are indicated in Table 7.  As expected, the shocks 
see  substantial  job  losses  in  the  principal  export  sectors,  electronics,  textiles  and  “other 
manufactures” but also in the state-owned  sectors, construction  and “other  services”.   The 
demand facing firms switches away from exports and so demand elasticities contract and mark-
ups  rise,  most  substantially  in  petroleum,  transport,  other  manufactures  and  metals.  
Nonetheless, all but agriculture face declines in their economic profits.
34 
 
Adding the expenditure expansion 
  The expansion of spending by seven per cent of GDP substantially reduces domestic 
saving and so constrains the current account (reducing the need for further foreign reserve 
accumulation).  Yet, as Table 6 shows, it has all the usual crowding out effects in the home 
                                                 
30 Consistent with the failure of Ricardian equivalence, in neither case is there any associated change in the 
household or corporate saving rate. 
31 Although the experiments have been carried out with long run and intermediate closures, except where 
mentioned subsequently in the text, the results add little value that is not revealed in the short run. 
32 The associated initial decline in export prices can be seen in reality from Figure 1. 
33 Land rents rise very slightly relative to the CPI but fall relative to foreign prices. 
34 Note, however, that the declines in pure profits in the heretofore immensely profitable state-owned sectors are 
small, as simulated, particularly compared with Chinese media pronouncements.   15 
economy.  The home investment financing interest rate rises
35 and investment falls, though by 
less  than  domestic  saving.    Reduced  net  outflows  on  the  capital  account  combine  with 
increased government expenditure on home products and (mainly) services to raise relative 
demand  for  home  varieties,  yielding  a  net  real  appreciation  (a  3.2  per  cent  turn-around).  
Contrary  to  Keynesian  wisdom,  the  expenditure  expansion  does  not  increase  output  and 
employment.  Instead, the negative consequences of the export contraction are exacerbated. 
As discussed in Section 3, the reasons for this departure from Keynesian convention are 
two-fold.  First, as the fifth column of Table 5 attests, most government expenditure is on non-
traded services.  The fiscal expansion therefore diverts expenditure away from home tradeable 
goods, further appreciating the real exchange rate and hurting the low-margin, labour-intensive 
export sectors.  This is clear from the sectoral pattern of employment changes indicated in 
Table 7.  Second, as can also be seen in Table 5, export demand is comparatively elastic and so 
the expansion in domestically directed government expenditure reduces the average elasticity 
faced in traded sectors and hence raises mark-ups charged by home firms, further appreciating 
the real exchange rate and hurting export employment.  From Table 7 it is clear that this effect 
is strongest in metals, petroleum, motor vehicles, transport and “other services”, where the 
rises in domestic prices are sufficient to cause a contraction in total demand in spite of the 
fiscal stimulus.  Construction demand also contracts substantially, though this is because of its 
significance in investment which is crowded out by government expenditure. 
The  relative  power  of  the  two  contractionary  effects  of  China’s  fiscal expansion  is 
readily  examined  using  the  model.    For  this  purpose  we  examine  the  fiscal  expansion  in 
isolation.    As  Table  8  shows,  it  causes  modest  net  contractions  in  both  GDP  and  total 
employment.  To assess the size of the oligopoly pricing effect, we constructed a new initial 
equilibrium following the imposition of average cost pricing in all sectors.  We then imposed 
the fiscal expansion while retaining the average cost pricing.  In this case the real appreciation 
is  only  a  third  as  large  and  the  real  wage  restraining  force  dominates,  so  that  modest 
expansions in both GDP and employment are achieved.
36.  The final two columns of the table 
indicate the difference made by the oligopoly pricing effect.  Oligopoly behaviour is clearly 
significant.    The  inward  redirection  of  demand  that  occurs  following  such  a  large  fiscal 
                                                 
35 Recall that this rate is that which equates saving with investment in the home capital market and the supply of 
saving falls.  The capital stock is fixed (there is no steady state) and so the rate of return on fixed capital falls, 
squeezing expected net returns from investment. 
36 Expenditure of seven per cent of GDP achieves a GDP expansion of one per cent.  Though it is not shown in the 
table, this gain comes at the expense of considerable structural change, with employment expanding in services 
and contracting in the export manufacturing sectors.   16 
expansion reduces demand elasticities and raises mark-ups yielding a negative turn-around of 
two per cent of GDP and 19 million jobs. 
Finally, our result that, given the special structure of China’s economy, the positive 
short run effects of a fiscal expansion are too weak to offset the real exchange rate effects 
needs to be seen in the context of our underlying assumptions.  A perfectly rigid nominal 
production wage, a rigid nominal exchange rate target and no Ricardian equivalence represent 
extreme conditions that favour the largest possible output effects from a fiscal expansion.  If 
anything, therefore, the power of a fiscal expansion is overstated in this analysis. 
 
Corporate tax reduction 
  Here  we  approximate  the  stated  intent  of  the  Chinese  government  to  relax  the  tax 
pressure on sectors suffering declines in export demand.  Separately for each industry, we 
reduce corporate tax rates by the proportion of exports in total revenue.  The results from this 
experiment are also displayed in Tables 6 and 7, the latter including the shocks to the powers of 
industry-specific capital income taxes.  Overall, these changes deny the government revenue 
amounting to a per cent and a half of initial GDP.  The effect of this is, once again, not to offer 
any significant offset to the contractionary effects of the export demand shocks.  The reason for 
this is that there is no exit of firms in the short run so the change in capital income tax rates has 
no direct effect on oligopoly pricing – it simply means that larger shares of accounting profits 
are retained by firms, reducing the sizes of the losses in corporate saving and consumption. 
The  loss  of  government  revenue,  combined  with  the  assumption  that  government 
expenditure  remains  constant,  increases  government  borrowing  as  with  the  expenditure 
expansion, with the same pattern of negative consequences.  From a social standpoint, the key 
short run consequence of this tax relief, evident from comparing the sixth and final columns of 
Table 7, is to cushion the loss of profitability in export sectors such as textiles and “other 
manufactures”.  Though this simulation does not quantify it, the tax relief would therefore have 
the effect of forestalling exits and thereby reducing the employment loss in export sectors.
37  
“Dollar for dollar”, the tax relief is better than the expenditure expansion because expenditure 
by  government  does  not  directly  replace  demand  in  export  sectors  whereas  the  private 
expenditure that is facilitated does replace some of the lost foreign demand.  Moreover, the tax 
                                                 
37 We have carried out this experiment with intermediate and long run closures that illustrate this effect on 
employment and its distribution.  The effect of the tax relief alone is to boost employment in “other 
manufacturing” by 2%, textiles by .3%, chemicals by .6% and motor vehicles by .3%.   17 
relief reduces costs and hence prices in the medium run (once firm numbers adjust) and so 
fosters the depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
 
6. The Export Slowdown with Further Industrial Reforms 
  China’s industrial reforms have contributed substantially to its overall economic growth 
in  the  past  two  decades,  and  this  includes  its  spectacular  growth  in  non-agricultural 
employment.  It is therefore of interest to consider whether more of the same could further 
boost employment in the face of the export slowdown.  Here we combine the export slowdown 
with two key elements of the industrial reform program: privatisation and competition policy.  
State-dominated  sectors  in  the  Chinese  economy,  including  steel  and  other  metals,  motor 
vehicles, coal and petroleum, transport and finance have enjoyed extremely large economic 
profits in recent years (Lu et al. 2008).  Since these profits have not been distributed to owners 
(tax-payers), about a fifth of China’s GDP is not available to households to allocate between 
consumption and saving (Kuijs 2006).  The result has been a declining consumption share of 
GDP and “excess” national saving.  By reducing oligopoly rents and hence corporate saving, 
privatisation  and  competition  policy  have  been  shown  to  have  the  potential  to  accelerate 
China’s growth, in both modern sector employment and output (Tyers and Lu 2008).  In this 




  The first shock simply places the majority of SOE assets in private hands so that profits 
are distributed to households.  In effect, the rates of corporate saving across industries are 
reduced until total corporate saving falls to a more normal five per cent of GDP.
38  A short run 
closure  is  again  assumed:  a  fixed  nominal  production  wage  with  flexible  production 
employment, no sectoral or international mobility of physical capital and fixed numbers of 
home firms (product varieties) with variable pure profits.
39  The economy-wide results are 
summarised in Table 9.  The loss of so much corporate saving raises the home interest rate and 
slows the rate of accumulation of official foreign reserves.  Higher borrowing costs further 
reduce investment but the fall is smaller than that in national saving and so the current account 
surplus is reduced by more than half.  The contraction in net outflows on the capital account 
appreciates the real exchange rate, which is bad for the low-margin export sectors.  This effect 
                                                 
38 This is the scale of corporate saving in Taiwan.  See Tyers and Lu (2008). 
39 Thus, privatisation is here assumed not to accompany mergers, acquisitions or new entries.   18 
is more than offset, however, by a rise in private consumption expenditure.  Privatisation alone 
is,  nonetheless,  insufficiently  positive  to  fully  offset  the  negative  effects  of  the  export 
slowdown on production employment or GDP. 
 
Price regulation 
  Since China’s very high level of corporate saving is associated with the profitability of 
its  oligopolistic  and  SOE  dominated  industries,  an  alternative  approach  to  resolving  the 
external imbalance would be to directly constrain the oligopoly pricing that yields these profits.  
This can be achieved both by regulation in the form of price surveillance, direct price caps and 
anti-trust policy, the latter in this case implying no more than the relaxation of barriers to entry.  
The experience in the industrial economies suggests  that this forces oligopoly  firms to set 
prices nearer to their average costs.
40  Here we think of these as delivering mark-ups in all 
sectors that are half-way between the most profitable levels on the one hand and the Ramsay 
levels, which set price equal to average cost, on the other.  For this purpose strategic behaviour 
in price setting is switched off in the model, to be replaced by equations (22) and (23).  This 
substantially reduces the pure profits that are shown in Table 2 to have been particularly large 
in the energy and metal sectors and in many of the services and in Table 7 to have been only 
slightly  contracted  by  the  export  slowdown.    Once  again,  short  run  closures  are  chosen.  
Because the price caps have a large effect on labour demand, however, it is no longer realistic 
to maintain nominal wage rigidity and so the market for production labour is set to clear.
41  
Finally, the government is assumed to set spending so as to maintain a constant fiscal surplus.  
The economy-wide results are summarised in Table 9. 
  The addition of the regulatory constraints on mark-ups has a very striking effect.  The 
prices of key intermediate products fall and so costs fall throughout the economy, relative to 
foreign  competition.   There  is,  therefore,  a  large  real  depreciation  and, even  including  the 
slowdown in export demand, considerable expansions in real GDP and GNP.  Even the real 
volume of exports grows (although export earnings fall slightly relative to import prices, export 
prices  fall  by  more,  as  suggested  by  the  real  exchange  rate  change).    Moreover,  the  now 
flexible real production wage is larger by almost a third and the real skilled wage is larger by 
almost a half.  The external imbalance is eliminated, with the current account surplus being 
replaced  by  a  smaller  deficit,  and  foreign  reserves  begin  to  contract.    These  extraordinary 
                                                 
40 See OECD (1997), Bradley and Price (1988) and Brennan (1989). 
41 With this shock, were the real production wage held constant, the demand for production labour would rise by 
more than a quarter, well beyond China’s pool of underemployed workers.   19 
changes are, however, due in part to the assumed short run immobility of physical capital.  
Capital returns are larger by a fifth (the market rate of return rises, yielding this gain in spite of 
smaller  pure  profits)  and  this  stimulates  investment  to  a  more  than  realistic  degree, 
compounding the shift of the current account toward deficit.
42 
  The  sectoral  effects  of  the  slowdown  combined  with  these  industrial  reforms  are 
presented in Table 10.  There is in this case a very large redistribution of the production labour 
force out of agriculture, processed agricultural products and textiles and into industries that 
benefit most from cost reductions.  These are less labour-intensive industries and they include 
metals, motor vehicles, other manufactures, finance and transport.  As Table 9 showed, price 
cap regulation brings large increases in real wages and so those industries with highest labour 
intensity (Table 4) tend to contract both their levels of employment and their output.  Even 
considering the higher unit factor rewards, many industries enjoy reductions in unit fixed costs 
as production runs expand.  These include metals, petroleum, motor vehicles, chemicals, other 
manufactures, transport and construction.  Finally, the composition of exports changes with 
increased concentration in metals and motor vehicles and there is an expanded external role for 
the Chinese transport industry. 
In aggregate, then, even though this policy regime retains some potentially distorting 
oligopolies, it is attractive in that it restores the prominence of consumption expenditure (which 
rises by a third) and it eliminates the external imbalance.  Yet it clearly sustains both export 
and  GDP  growth.    Moreover,  it  moves  the  structure  of  the  economy  away  from  its  prior 
dependence on inexpensive raw labour toward a more mature phase in which China’s services 
industries are larger and more competitive and the composition of its trade is more similar to 
that of most industrialised economies. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The Chinese government’s key response to the global economic slowdown, and the 
consequent reduction in export demand, was to commit to an unprecedented fiscal expansion.  
We offer an economy-wide analysis of the effects of the export slowdown, using a 17 sector 
model of the Chinese economy that takes explicit account of oligopoly behaviour.  This model 
is used to simulate both the export demand contraction and a range of policy responses, with 
the simulated contraction causing substantial losses of both output and employment in the short 
run.    When  fiscal  expansions  are  applied,  however,  the  results  contrast  with  Keynesian 
                                                 
42 At roughly 45% of GDP already, the scope for yet larger annual commitments to investment in China must be 
limited by absorption capacity and the availability of viable projects (Tyers and Bain 2008).   20 
conventional wisdom in that, whether by spending increase or tax relief, they are shown to 
exacerbate the contractions in both employment and GDP. 
The  special  structure  of  China’s  economy  proves  important  in  these  results, and  in 
particular, the immense contribution to GDP and employment of the low-margin, privately 
owned export manufacturing sector, which competes for resources with high-margin, mainly 
state-owned oligopolies in metals, energy, motor vehicles, telecommunications, finance and 
transport.    This  structure  exacerbates  two  consequences  of  fiscal  expansions  for  China’s 
economic performance.  First, government spending (and even government investment in the 
short  run)  is  largely  on  non-traded  goods  and  services  and  so  there  is  an  expenditure 
composition  effect  that  enlarges  the  consequent  real  appreciation,  hurting  export 
manufacturing.  Second, and less widely understood, is that fiscal expansions shift demand 
inward and that a more inward-looking economy causes firms to face less elastic demand and 
hence  to  increase  oligopoly  rents.    Given  that  China’s  oligopolies  are  not  in  its  export 
manufacturing sector this further enlarges the deleterious real appreciation.  Indeed this latter 
effect is shown, under our modelling assumptions, to be large enough to more than reverse net 
short run gains from fiscal expansions. 
The alternative of continuing, or accelerating, China’s program of industrial reforms, is 
shown to offer new growth that swamps the effect of the export demand contraction.  With 
further privatisation and price cap regulation in the sectors that remain dominated by state-
owned oligopoly firms, costs are shown to be sufficiently reduced across the entire economy to 
depreciate  the  real  exchange  rate,  allowing  growth  in  both  output  and  modern  sector 
employment to continue.  Yet that growth is no longer led by the low-margin labour-intensive 
manufacturing sector.  Real wages of China’s production workers rise considerably and there is 
a modernisation of the structure of both its economy and its external trade. 
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Source: China's  External  Trade Indices  Monthly,  since  2005.    Data  before  2005  was  provided  by Professor 
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Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008.   24 
Figure 3:  Expenditure Composition and the Real Exchange Rate 
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Figure 4:  Service Oligopoly Rents and the Real Exchange Rate 
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Table 1: Government expenditure and GDP growth rate, 131 countries 
(Ranked according to G/Y in 1999-2006) 
region  G/Y  Real GDP growth rate 
  1960-2006  1999-2006  1960-2006  1999-2006 
Asian developing  11.3  9.6  5.4  5.9 
Latin America  11.6  12.4  3.5  3.2 
Africa  14.2  13.6  3.7  4.2 
Europe and Middle East  17.8  17.0  3.6  5.5 
Industrialised  18.0  19.8  3.2  2.5 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008. 
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Value  added 
share of GDP 




Share  of 
total 
exports 
Pure  profit 
share  of 
gross 
revenue 
Agriculture  13  24  2  0 
Petroleum, coal, metals  16  11  10  20 
Light manufacturing  29  33  82  5 
Services  42  32  6  20 
Total  100  100  100  12 
a Pure profits are calculated from national statistics estimates of accounting profits, deducting required 
returns to service industry specific prime rates.  Here they are presented gross of tax and corporate saving 
and as shares of total revenue. 
Source: Model database (social accounting matrix), derived from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002), and 




Table 3: Model scope 
Regions  China 
  Rest of world 
   
Primary factors  Land 
  Natural resources (mineral, energy deposits) 
  Skilled (professional) labour 
  Unskilled (production) labour 
  Physical capital 
   
Industries  Agriculture 
  Metals, including steel, minerals and (non-coal) mining 
  Coal mining and production 
  Petroleum production and refining 
  Processed agricultural products 
  Electronic equipment 
  Motor vehicles 
  Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
  Textiles 
  Other manufactures 
  Electricity supply and distribution 
  Gas supply and distribution 
  Telecommunications 
  Insurance and finance 
  Transport 
  Construction 
  Other Services 




Table 4: Factor Intensities by Industry
a 




Land and nat 
resources 
Agriculture  11  59  0  30 
Metals & minerals  66  27  5  2 
Coal  28  30  3  39 
Petroleum  86  5  1  7 
Processed agriculture  38  54  7  0 
Electronic equipment  66  26  8  0 
Motor vehicles  59  35  6  0 
Chemical products  62  32  6  0 
Textiles  40  52  7  0 
Other manufactures  68  27  5  0 
Electricity  69  21  11  0 
Gas mfg & distribution  49  37  14  0 
Communications  92  5  3  0 
Insurance and finance  80  12  8  0 
Transport  78  18  4  0 
Construction  56  37  7  0 
Other Services  54  27  19  0 
a  These are factor shares of total value added in each industry, calculated from the database.  Capital 
shares include pure profits.  Shares sum to 100 per cent horizontally. 
Source: Model database (social accounting matrix), derived from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002). 
 




Table 5: Initial Demand Shares, Elasticities and Mark-ups
a 










Final  Export  Invest 
ment 
Govt  Inter 
mediate 
Final  Export  Invest 
ment 
Govt     
Agriculture  53  40  4  3  0  -10.2  -28.6  -40.1  -15.6  -16.0  -18.8  1.06 
Metals, Minerals  84  3  10  2  1  -2.9  -4.4  -8.9  -2.8  -2.8  -3.5  1.39 
Coal  61  4  33  0  2  -3.6  -6.1  -11.2  -2.4  -2.5  -6.2  1.19 
Petroleum  58  12  5  14  12  -2.1  -2.8  -6.2  -2.3  -2.1  -2.4  1.69 
Proc agriculture  50  34  15  0  1  -12.0  -30.8  -26.8  -16.4  -17.0  -20.7  1.05 
Electronics  24  4  65  6  0  -2.7  -6.4  -9.8  -2.9  -2.9  -7.5  1.15 
Motor vehicles  46  8  15  29  1  -4.8  -10.0  -16.9  -3.4  -3.7  -6.6  1.18 
Chemicals  77  6  17  0  0  -3.6  -6.3  -10.4  -2.5  -2.5  -4.9  1.26 
Textiles  45  11  44  0  0  -6.5  -16.9  -25.7  -10.4  -10.2  -16.1  1.07 
Other mfg  43  5  35  16  0  -2.6  -7.1  -9.5  -4.0  -4.0  -5.5  1.22 
Electricity  84  13  1  1  1  -6.4  -12.3  -21.0  -7.5  -7.7  -7.3  1.16 
Gas mfg & distn  50  10  0  8  32  -4.9  -7.7  -13.4  -4.8  -4.9  -5.2  1.24 
Telecommunications  42  24  1  5  27  -1.7  -1.4  -5.1  -1.5  -1.7  -1.7  2.45 
Finance  57  29  2  3  8  -1.8  -2.6  -6.6  -2.2  -2.2  -2.2  1.86 
Transport  53  18  8  7  14  -1.3  -1.6  -5.9  -1.6  -1.5  -1.8  2.26 
Construction  4  2  0  86  8  -2.5  -5.1  -12.3  -4.4  -4.0  -4.3  1.30 
Other Services  46  21  4  4  25  -3.4  -8.6  -11.7  -3.1  -2.8  -4.7  1.27 
a All these variables are endogenous in the model.  Initial (base) values are provided here. 
b Industry mark-ups are the ratio of producer prices and average variable costs. 
Source: Model database, derived from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) and 2005 national statistics.   29
      Table 6: Short Run Economic Effects of the Export Slowdown and Fiscal Responses
a 
Export slowdown alone
b  Export  slowdown  with  government 
expenditure expansion, 7% GDP
c 
Export  slowdown  with  tax  relief  in  export 
sectors
d 
  % changes  % base real GDP
e  % changes  % base real GDP
e  % changes  % base real GDP
e 
Real GNP
f  -2.8    -3.2    -3.0   
Real GDP
g  -3.5    -4.2    -3.6   
Real exchange rate  -1.1    2.2    -0.7   
Consumption
f  -1.9  -1.5  -3.9  -1.4  -1.6  -1.3 
Household saving
e  -3.7  -0.9  -3.4  -0.8  -3.2  -0.8 
Corporate saving
e  -7.3  -1.2  0.3  0.1  -5.4  -0.9 
Government saving
e  0.0  0.0  -998  -7.5  -194  -1.5 
National saving
e  -5.0  -2.1  -19.6  -8.3  -7.5  -3.1 
Investment
e  -6.8  -2.4  -8.4  -3.0  -7.2  -2.5 
Foreign investment
e  -0.1  0.0  2.7  0.1  0.3  0.0 
Reserve accumulation
e  2.6  0.3  -54.5  -5.3  -6.4  -0.6 
Value of Exports
e  -8.7  -3.4  -20.1  -7.9  -10.2  -4.0 
Value of Imports
e  -8.6  -2.6  -6.7  -2.0  -8.4  -2.6 
Trade surplus
e  -9.2  -0.8  -67.2  -5.8  -16.4  -1.4 
Current account surplus
e  1.8  0.1  -75.7  -5.5  -10.5  -0.8 
Production employment  -2.5    -2.6    -2.4   
Real unskilled wage
f  1.1    -2.2    0.7   
Real skilled wage
f  -3.7    -2.3    -3.5   
Real land rent
f  0.5    -4.4    0.1   
Real resource rent
f  -4.8    -8.2    -5.1   
Av gross rate of return
h  -5.3    -3.3    -5.1   
a  All these simulations use a short run closure in which numbers of firms are fixed and pure profits endogenous, physical capital is fixed at the sectoral level with rates of 
return endogenous and the real wage of production workers is fixed with all labour mobile between sectors.  The fiscal closure differs depending on the simulation. 
b  The export slowdown is a common shift in all rest-of-world excess demand functions sufficient to reduce the real value of total exports by 8%.  In this case the fiscal 
closure maintains an exogenous fiscal deficit and hence has endogenous government spending. 
c  This simulation has the same export demand shock.  But here government spending is made exogenous and the fiscal surplus endogenous.  Government spending is then 
shocked upward by 47%, or about 7% of initial GDP, keeping all rates of taxation constant. 
d  The powers of industry-specific capital income taxes are adjusted to reflect zero tax on capital income from export production. 
e  Measured relative to (fixed) international (import) prices. 
f  To facilitate welfare interpretation this is expressed relative to the consumer price index. 
g  As a measure of collective output volume, this is expressed relative to the GDP price. 
h  The rate of return on physical capital is here gross of depreciation and inclusive of pure economic profits.  The percentage change in the rate is shown, rather than the 
difference in percentage or basis points. 
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.   30
 
 
     Table 7: Short Run Sectoral Effects of the Export Slowdown and Fiscal Responses
a 
Export slowdown alone
b  Export  slowdown  with  government 
expenditure expansion, 7% GDP
c  Export slowdown with tax relief in export sectors
d 





ratio,  % 
change 
Change  in 
after  tax 
pure  profit, 
% 





ratio,  % 
change 
Change  in 
after  tax 
pure  profit, 
% 
Change  in 
power  of 
capital 
income  tax, 
% 





ratio,  % 
change 
Change  in 
after  tax 
pure  profit, 
% 
Agriculture  -0.7  0.0  -9.2  -3.8  -0.1  -30.3  0.0  -0.7  0.0  -11.0 
Metals & minerals  -2.9  0.4  -8.0  -4.2  1.6  -6.8  -1.0  -3.0  0.6  -8.0 
Coal  0.0  -0.8  -14.4  -0.2  0.3  -8.6  -2.1  0.0  -0.7  -13.8 
Petroleum  -0.1  5.6  -7.4  0.0  5.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.1  5.4  -6.6 
Proc agriculture  0.1  0.0  -0.7  -1.4  0.0  -1.2  -0.9  0.0  0.0  -0.7 
Electronics  -1.4  0.2  -12.2  -1.9  0.4  -15.7  -0.2  -1.5  0.2  -12.6 
Motor vehicles  -0.2  -0.3  -12.7  -0.9  2.0  3.8  -1.8  -0.3  0.0  -11.2 
Chemical products  -0.4  0.3  -8.2  -0.8  0.9  -12.3  -2.3  -0.4  0.4  -8.5 
Textiles  -1.5  0.0  -5.7  -6.0  0.1  -20.1  -4.6  -1.9  0.0  -7.1 
Other manufactures  -3.9  0.5  -7.9  -5.6  1.0  -9.5  -4.5  -4.1  0.6  -8.2 
Electricity  -0.1  -0.1  8.3  -0.1  -0.1  9.7  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  8.6 
Gas mfg & distn  0.0  0.0  61.5  0.1  -0.1  -105  0.0  0.0  -0.1  44.8 
Telecommunications  0.0  0.2  -5.7  0.0  -0.2  9.5  -0.1  0.0  0.2  -4.0 
Finance  -0.3  -0.1  -5.9  0.0  0.4  -0.3  -0.1  -0.3  0.0  -5.2 
Transport  -1.1  2.7  -4.4  -1.2  9.4  9.8  -0.6  -1.1  3.5  -2.7 
Construction  -3.5  0.0  -8.2  -1.0  -1.1  -10.3  0.0  -3.3  -0.2  -8.7 
Other Services  -4.1  -0.1  -6.3  5.9  1.7  17.5  -0.6  -2.9  0.0  -3.8 
Total  -20.0  ..  -7.3  -21.2  ..  0.5  ..  -19.8  ..  -6.6 
a  All these simulations use a short run closure in which numbers of firms are fixed and pure profits endogenous, physical capital is fixed at the sectoral level with rates of 
return endogenous and the real wage of production workers is fixed with all labour mobile between sectors.  The fiscal closure differs depending on the simulation. 
b  The export slowdown is a common shift in all rest-of-world excess demand functions sufficient to reduce the real value of total exports by 8%.  In this case the fiscal 
closure maintains an exogenous fiscal deficit and hence has endogenous government spending. 
c  This simulation has the same export demand shock.  But here government spending is made exogenous and the fiscal surplus endogenous.  Government spending is then 
shocked upward by 47%, or about 7% of initial GDP, keeping all rates of taxation constant. 
d  The powers of industry-specific capital income taxes (1+rate) are adjusted to reflect zero tax on industry-specific capital income from export production. 
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.   31
     Table 8: Short Run Economic Effects of the Fiscal Expansion Alone
a 
Government  expenditure  expansion 
alone, 7% GDP
b 
Government expenditure expansion alone, 
7% GDP with no oligopoly rents
c 
Difference in fiscal expansion effects due to 
changes in oligopoly rents
d 
  % changes  % base real GDP
e  % changes  % base real GDP
e  % changes  % base real GDP
e 
Real GNP
f  -0.7    1.2    -2.0   
Real GDP
g  -1.1    1.3    -2.4   
Real exchange rate  2.9    0.9    2.0   
Consumption
f  -2.1  0.0  2.3  1.2  -4.3  -1.2 
Household saving
e  0.0  0.0  3.0  0.7  -3.0  -0.7 
Corporate saving
e  6.2  1.0  0.1  0.0  6.1  1.0 
Government saving
e  -901  -6.8  -871  -6.6  -29.9  -0.2 
National saving
e  -13.6  -5.7  -13.7  -5.8  0.1  0.0 
Investment
e  -2.3  -0.8  -3.3  -1.2  1.0  0.4 
Foreign investment
e  2.5  0.1  2.4  0.1  0.2  0.0 
Reserve accumulation
e  -50.4  -4.9  -47.3  -4.6  -3.2  -0.3 
Value of Exports
e  -10.5  -4.1  -6.7  -2.6  -3.8  -1.5 
Value of Imports
e  1.3  0.4  5.4  1.6  -4.1  -1.2 
Trade surplus
e  -52.1  -4.5  -49.2  -4.3  -2.9  -0.3 
Current account surplus
e  -68.5  -4.9  -63.2  -4.6  -5.3  -0.4 
Production employment  -0.3    2.0    -2.4   
Real unskilled wage
f  -2.9    -0.9    -2.0   
Real skilled wage
f  0.6    7.9    -7.2   
Real land rent
f  -4.4    -1.3    -3.1   
Real resource rent
f  -3.6    1.2    -4.9   
Av gross rate of return
h  1.1    1.5    -0.4   
a  All these simulations use a short run closure in which numbers of firms are fixed and pure profits endogenous, physical capital is fixed at the sectoral level with rates of 
return endogenous and the real wage of production workers is fixed with all labour mobile between sectors.  The fiscal closure has government expenditure exogenous, and 
shocked, while the fiscal deficit is endogenous. 
b  This is a fiscal expansion shock considered in isolation - in the absence of any changes in export demand. 
c  Here full price regulation is imposed at the outset, so that P=AC in all sectors and hence there are no oligopoly rents.  The fiscal expansion is then introduced while 
maintaining this regulatory regime.  Mark-ups change only to retain zero economic profits. 
d  These columns show the differences between the effects of the pure fiscal expansion with and without simulated oligopoly pricing responses. 
d  The powers of industry-specific capital income taxes are adjusted to reflect zero tax on capital income from export production. 
e  Measured relative to (fixed) international (import) prices. 
f  To facilitate welfare interpretation this is expressed relative to the consumer price index. 
g  As a measure of collective output volume, this is expressed relative to the GDP price. 
h  The rate of return on physical capital is here gross of depreciation and inclusive of pure economic profits.  The percentage change in the rate is shown, rather than the 
difference in percentage or basis points. 
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.  32
Table 9: Short Run Economic Effects of the Export Slowdown with Accelerated Industrial Reforms
a 
Export slowdown alone
b  Export  slowdown  with  further  SOE 
privatisation
c 
Export slowdown with SOE privatisation and 
price cap regulation
d 
  % changes  % base real GDP
e  % changes  % base real GDP
e  % changes  % base real GDP
e 
Real GNP
f  -2.8    -1.4    14.0   
Real GDP
g  -3.5    -2.1    20.4   
Real exchange rate  -1.1    0.8    -5.4   
Consumption
f  -1.9  -1.5  15.4  6.3  33.2  13.2 
Household saving
e  -3.7  -0.9  15.2  3.8  32.0  8.0 
Corporate saving
e  -7.3  -1.2  -71.2  -11.8  -69.1  -11.5 
Government saving
e  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
National saving
e  -5.0  -2.1  -19.1  -8.1  -8.4  -3.5 
Investment
e  -6.8  -2.4  -8.0  -2.8  21.0  7.4 
Foreign investment
e  -0.1  0.0  2.7  0.1  5.6  0.1 
Reserve accumulation
e  2.6  0.3  -53.5  -5.2  -111.3  -10.8 
Value of Exports
e  -8.7  -3.4  -18.2  -7.1  -1.4  -0.5 
Value of Imports
e  -8.6  -2.6  -4.1  -1.2  31.3  9.5 
Trade surplus
e  -9.2  -0.8  -67.9  -5.9  -116.2  -10.1 
Current account surplus
e  1.8  0.1  -73.7  -5.3  -145.4  -10.5 
Production employment  -2.5    -0.4    0.0   
Real unskilled wage
f  1.1    -0.8    28.2   
Real skilled wage
f  -3.7    -1.9    43.7   
Real land rent
f  0.5    4.9    14.3   
Real resource rent
f  -4.8    -3.8    40.7   
a  All these simulations use a short run closure in which numbers of firms are fixed and pure profits endogenous, physical capital is fixed at the sectoral level with rates of 
return endogenous and the real wage of production workers is fixed with all labour mobile between sectors.  The fiscal closure differs depending on the simulation. 
b  The export slowdown is a common shift in all rest-of-world excess demand functions sufficient to reduce the real value of total exports by 6%.  In this case the fiscal 
closure maintains an exogenous fiscal deficit and hence has endogenous government spending. 
c  This simulation has the same export demand shock.  But here the corporate saving rate is reduced sufficient to contract corporate saving to about 5% of GDP. 
d  Here the shocks combine the export slowdown, privatisation sufficient to reduce corporate saving to about 5% of GDP and price cap regulation sufficient to reduce mark-
ups half way to the Ramsay (zero pure profit) rates.  Because a fixed real production wage yields an unrealistically large rise in labour use a flexible wage closure is used. 
d  The powers of industry-specific capital income taxes are adjusted to reflect zero tax on capital income from export production. 
e  Measured relative to (fixed) international (import) prices. 
f  To facilitate welfare interpretation this is expressed relative to the consumer price index. 
g  As a measure of collective output volume, this is expressed relative to the GDP price. 
h  The rate of return on physical capital is here gross of depreciation and inclusive of pure economic profits.  The percentage change in the rate is shown, rather than the 
difference in percentage or basis points. 
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.   33
 
 
     Table 10: Short Run Sectoral Effects of the Export Slowdown with Accelerated Industrial Reforms
a 
Export slowdown alone
b  Export  slowdown  with  further  SOE 
privatisation
c 
Export  slowdown  with  SOE 
privatisation and price cap regulation
d 





ratio,  % 
change 
Change  in 
after  tax 
pure  profit, 
% 





ratio,  % 
change 
Change  in 
after  tax 
pure  profit, 
% 





ratio,  % 
change 
Change  in 
after  tax 
pure  profit, 
% 
Agriculture  -0.7  0.0  -9.2  11.1  -0.1  10.1  -21.8  -0.1  -108.1 
Metals & minerals  -2.9  0.4  -8.0  -3.5  1.0  -7.2  15.5  -2.4  -20.1 
Coal  0.0  -0.8  -14.4  -0.2  0.5  -5.2  -0.2  5.7  4.5 
Petroleum  -0.1  5.6  -7.4  0.0  4.5  -4.0  0.1  2.4  -6.2 
Proc agriculture  0.1  0.0  -0.7  1.1  -0.1  1.5  -5.9  0.1  -39.1 
Electronics  -1.4  0.2  -12.2  -1.6  0.3  -13.0  -0.5  0.8  -37.9 
Motor vehicles  -0.2  -0.3  -12.7  -0.4  0.6  -4.2  2.2  -2.4  -36.1 
Chemical products  -0.4  0.3  -8.2  -0.5  0.8  -3.0  0.8  0.4  -19.0 
Textiles  -1.5  0.0  -5.7  -3.5  0.1  -5.2  -23.7  0.8  -67.3 
Other manufactures  -3.9  0.5  -7.9  -4.3  0.7  -7.5  2.9  1.9  -22.7 
Electricity  -0.1  -0.1  8.3  0.0  -0.3  10.8  0.2  0.2  -54.0 
Gas mfg & distn  0.0  0.0  61.5  0.0  -0.3  45.9  0.0  -0.1  -78.0 
Telecommunications  0.0  0.2  -5.7  0.0  1.2  2.4  0.1  0.0  -9.6 
Finance  -0.3  -0.1  -5.9  0.2  -0.7  0.9  2.8  0.6  -11.6 
Transport  -1.1  2.7  -4.4  -1.1  6.6  4.8  8.6  -12.6  -26.1 
Construction  -3.5  0.0  -8.2  -3.3  -0.3  -9.8  6.4  -0.3  -33.6 
Other Services  -4.1  -0.1  -6.3  2.6  -0.6  -2.3  12.4  0.2  -30.5 
Total  -20.0  ..  -7.3  -3.4  ..  -4.0  0.0  ..  -22.8 
a  All these simulations use a short run closure in which numbers of firms are fixed and pure profits endogenous, physical capital is fixed at the sectoral level with rates of 
return endogenous and the real wage of production workers is fixed with all labour mobile between sectors.  The fiscal closure differs depending on the simulation. 
b  The export slowdown is a common shift in all rest-of-world excess demand functions sufficient to reduce the real value of total exports by 6%.  In this case the fiscal 
closure maintains an exogenous fiscal deficit and hence has endogenous government spending. 
c  This simulation has the same export demand shock.  But here government spending is made exogenous and the fiscal surplus endogenous.  Government spending is then 
shocked upward by 47%, or 7% of initial GDP, keeping all rates of taxation constant. 
d  Here the shocks combine the export slowdown, privatisation sufficient to reduce corporate saving to about 5% of GDP and price cap regulation sufficient to reduce mark-
ups half way to the Ramsay (zero pure profit) rates.  Because a fixed real production wage yields an unrealistically large rise in labour use a flexible wage closure is used. 
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text. 
 
 
 